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ABSTRACT 
 
Competitive behavior between players in a mature market can have a different 
structure than those in growing markets. Pricing component of the marketing mix 
is less relied upon to expand market share in growing markets, while there is a 
greater reliance upon product differentiation and building stronger brand equity. 
On the other hand, in mature markets, there is usually very little scope for product 
differentiation, so there is a greater reliance on pricing for competitive gains. 
Since market share expansion in a mature market comes directly from competitive 
sales declines, pricing strategy changes in one brand leads to a fairly 
instantaneous reaction from other brands in the category and retail prices in 
general reflect the equilibrium condition of consumption.  
This paper applies methods from Time Series Econometrics to identify 
nonstationary behavior and long-run equilibrium of retail prices of brands in 
mature and evolving markets. The results indicate that long-run equilibrium in 
prices may be an outcome of the maturity of markets, as the persistence of the 
shocks in the prices do not result in the persistence in shocks to sales. The 
cointegrating condition created by the intense price competition imposes a 
stationarity restriction on sales, hence eliminating the possibility of any long term 
pricing strategy and pricing becomes tactical. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In young markets or products, market expansion leads to sales evolution; however in 
mature or equilibrium markets, sales are typically stable.2 
 
Competitive price responses and sales evolution or disequilibrium are a direct result 
of Brand competition. Since pricing decisions have a direct impact on profits and 
prices themselves are a function of supply-side factors like input-costs, commodity 
prices, a change in long-term pricing strategy is not something that Brand managers 
would like to do often.  
 
Therefore, when the category itself is growing and evolving, Brand Managers may 
resort to other options like increasing consumer awareness and product differentiation 
through different advertising and positioning strategies. But when the markets are 
mature, there is not too much innovation and differentiation possible in the product, 
and consumer awareness and distribution hover around the maximum. Therefore 
there is a greater tendency for Brand Managers to rely on pricing and promotional 
strategies to improve market share. 
 
Since market share expansion in a mature market comes directly from competitive 
sales declines, competitive reaction to any new marketing initiative is fierce and retail 
prices in general reflect the equilibrium condition of consumption.  
 
Recent research in brand competition have leveraged Time Series techniques like 
Unit Root, Cointegration Tests and Equilibrium-correction models to analyze and 
model Brand evolution and market equilibrium. They have established that some 
categories, brand and control factors are stable while others are in various stages of 
evolution or equilibrium (for e.g. Dekimpe and Hanssens, 1995).  
Dekimpe, Hanssens and Silva-Risso (1999) have enumerated the following four 
scenarios of market evolution: 
 
1. Stable brand sales occurring in a stable category implying that all gains and losses 
are temporary and brand marketing is tactical in nature. 
2. Stable brand sales in an evolving category implies a lack of long-run marketing 
effectiveness as the brand is unable to establish permanent gains, in spite of 
operating in an evolving category. 
3. Evolving brand sales in a stable category implies that the brand is locked in a 
strategic battle for long-run position. 
4. Evolving Brand sales in an evolving category, implying that firms may be able to 
improve not only their absolute long-run performance but also their relative 
position. 
 
A Brand that is reflective of #2 above may not survive for long as the other evolving 
Brands within the category will most likely annihilate its market share 
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 In this study we use the concepts of stability and evolution synonymously with stationarity and 
nonstationarity respectively. We also treat nonstationarity and unit root processes synonymously. 
#3 can be considered a direct result of the different performance regimes Brands may 
go through. Pauwels and Hanssens (2004) have suggested that brand performance is 
subject to two opposing influences: mean reversion and change and that neither lasts 
for a long time in mature markets. Therefore it is possible that in a stable category we 
could have brands that could be going through a regime of evolution.  
 
Therefore both #2 & #3 can be considered as exceptions.  
 
In general if an oligopolistic category such as the one analyzed here, if the category is 
evolving most likely the brands are too and if the category is stable, so are the brands 
that comprise it. 
 
For the purposes of this study we can simplify this classification into: 
1. Brands with stable sales in a stable category. 
2. Brands with evolving sales in an evolving category. 
 
The competitive dynamics in both cases can be captured through the sales response 
function, by specifying Brand sales as a function of Brand marketing and pricing as 
well as competitive and environmental factors, using regression-based estimation. 
This is generally referred to as a ‘marketing-mix’ model (Joseph, 2004). A wide 
variety of lagged, non-linear and seasonal effects can be controlled for in this method. 
 
Since the sales-response model for #2 would involve regression between 
nonstationary variables, standard regression estimation and inference become invalid 
(Granger & Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986). In this case, depending on the existence 
or absence of equilibrium relationships evidenced by cointegration, either an 
Error/Equilibrium Correction Model, or a model in first differences could be specified 
(Engle, R. F. & Granger, C. W. J., 1987). 
 
In #1, if both sales and the explanatory variables are stationary, we can estimate the 
sales response function using the levels of the series. An interesting situation arises if 
the sales series is stationary, but some of the control variables are nonstationary. The 
common econometric practice is to difference the nonstationary variables, since there 
is no Error Correction Representation possible.  
 
According to Joseph, 2004, if the nonstationary explanatory variables are 
cointegrated, it may possible to include the nonstationary explanatory variables in 
their levels, since the cointegrating relationship causes their linear combination to be 
stationary. This is especially possible in mature categories, because of the intense 
competition between Brands, competing factors like retail prices or promotions 
neutralize stochastic trends in each other which might otherwise have led to 
nonstationary sales for one Brand.  
 
For instance, consider the sales of Brand as the function of its own and its 
competitor’s retail price; if one Brand is a price leader and another a price follower 
and both price series are nonstationary, they will have a common stochastic trend and 
in the sales equation these trends will cancel each other out since the own price and 
the cross-price coefficients/elasticity will have opposite signs.3 
 
This gives us an important insight into the dynamics of mature markets; the sales-
price relationship for Brands in mature markets, reflect the equilibrium condition of 
consumption. Competitive price responses in an effort to defend market share, creates 
a cointegrating condition between Brands’ prices, which results in mean-reversion in 
sales despite nonstationarity of prices; the stochastic shocks in prices do not translate 
to persistent effects on sales. Sales return to equilibrium levels after temporary 
periods of disequilibrium. Therefore Sales become a function of not only current 
period Price changes but also of the lagged disequilibrium response, which causes 
equilibrium correction in both the Price series and the Sales series. The error 
correction term therefore belongs in both the difference Price Equation, which would 
be the Error Correction representation in the sense of Engle and Granger, 1987, but 
also of the levels Sales equation. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; 
Section 2 reviews the data and also undertakes a preliminary analysis of the 
competitive environment as a precursor to a more structured Time Series Analysis of 
the variables, which follows in Section 3. Section 4 develops the functional model for 
the sales response function for the three brands and Section 4 reviews the empirical 
model results. Lastly Section 5 discusses the findings and develops conclusions and 
some directions for further research. 
 
2. Data & Preliminary Competitive Analysis 
a. Data: 
The empirical data for this study has been collected from Syndicated Point-of-Sales 
information for a Beverage category. The data represents weekly sales, average retail 
price, price discounts, distribution, merchandising and Television advertising for 
three competing brands in four different geographic markets. 
 
Due to client confidentiality and non-disclosure reasons we will refer to the three 
Brands as Brand A, Brand B and Brand C, and the four markets as Market I, Market 
II, Market III and Market IV. 
 
The following is a list of variables that were originally tested for inclusion in each of 
the model estimated: 
 
1. Log-transformed Market-level Sales for Brands A, B and C. 
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 There might be instances where a brand exhibits nonstationarity in one of its marketing activities, whereas 
its competitor doesn’t show a similar nonstationary effect. In this case it might be conjectured that the sales 
of that brand is not impacted by the absolute levels of the nonstationary variable, only by its increments. 
For example if a brand exhibits nonstationarity in its price discount variable over time and there is no 
corresponding cointegrating effect in its competitor’s price discounts, it  is possible that sales are driven not 
by the level of price discounting but by the change in price discounting one period to the next (Joseph, 
2004). 
2. Log-transformed Market-level Average retail price for Brands A, B and C, 
calculated as the log of the ratio of Total Dollar Sales to Total Equivalized 
Unit Sales. 
3. Price Discounts calculated as the percent difference between non-promoted 
price and promoted price. 
4. Market-level Distribution for Brands A, B and C. This is a syndicated measure 
and is generally calculated as the average percent of All Commodity Volume 
(ACV) in a market that had sales for a specific item or brand during a specific 
time period. 
5. Market-level Merchandising represented by the percent of a market’s ACV 
which sold a particular product with any type of trade support- Feature, 
Display, Feature and Display, temporary Price Reduction (TPR). 
6. Commodity price (Average Daily Close aggregated to Weekly frequency 
using simple averaging) obtained from the New York Board of Trade website 
for the underlying commodity that is an input for the finished product that 
makes the category. 
7. Seasonality variable created using a 52-week seasonal index of total base sales 
for all three Brands.4 
8. Television advertising for Brands A and B, represented by planned Gross 
Ratings Points collected from the media scheduling plans. Brand C executed 
very little Television advertising which was not available. The GRP data was 
transformed assuming a lagged log decay of the effect of TV Advertising on 
consumers.5 
 
All of the above data is for weekly frequency and where they were not, they have 
been converted to a weekly frequency. 
 
b. Preliminary Competitive Analysis: 
 
We undertook a preliminary competitive analysis of the three brands to determine the 
competitive landscape. Below is a summary of market-shares6 and year-over-year 
market share and average price changes, for the three Brands in each of the four 
markets: 
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 Base sales as provided through Syndicated data sources excludes promotional volume, hence the seasonal 
index calculated this way is not influenced by seasonal trade promotions. We added the three Brands base 
sales as a proxy for total category sales. 
5
 Broadbent (1979) introduced the concept of Adstock, which assumes advertising has a delayed effect 
extending several periods beyond the original exposure. The transformation we use assumes an average 
decay of about 20% per week for a 5 week period in a distributed lag model. 
6
 Market-shares have been calculated assuming these three Brands comprise the category, which is 
approximately correct since the remaining players have comparatively negligible sales. 
1. Market I:  
Fig.1 Historical Market Shares 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Historical Market Share & Average Price % Change 
 
 
 
 
For Market I, the market-shares reveal that Brand A is the dominant player closely 
followed by Brand B, and Brand C is a relatively small player in the category. 
Average price changes for Brands A and B are similar. Market share changes seem to 
be negligible with each Brand more or less maintaining its position in the market. 
 
2. Market II:  
Fig.3 Historical Market Shares 
 
 
 
Fig.4 Historical Market Share & Average Price % Change 
 
For Market II, Brand B seems to have slightly bettered its position overall by gaining 
share against Brand A, but in the present year Brand A seems to have stabilized. The 
Increase in Brand B’s market-share doesn’t seem to have resulted from a pricing 
change since it actually increased its price in the same period. 
 
3. Market III:  
Fig.5 Historical Market Shares 
 
 Fig.6 Historical Market Share & Average Price % Change 
 
 
For Market III, until the present year all Brands seem to have maintained their 
relative positions. In the present year, Brand B again seems to have made competitive 
incursions on Brand A, once more not apparently resulting from change in its pricing 
since Brand B price has increased during the same period. 
 
4. Market IV:  
 
Fig.7 Historical Market Shares 
 
 
 
Fig.8 Historical Market Share & Average Price % Change 
 
 
For Market IV, in spite of average Price fluctuations, all Brands seem to be more 
or less maintaining relative positions. 
 
Overall, from a preliminary analysis of the market shares and average Price 
changes in the four markets, we can see that significant Price fluctuations do not 
correspond to significant long-run market-share changes (This doesn’t necessarily 
imply a low demand elasticity of price, since at the weekly levels, there might be 
significant short-run impact, which will only be revealed in a response model. 
 
3. Unit Root & Cointegration Testing 
 
a. Unit Root Testing: 
We used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test to determine if 
stochastic trends were present in each of the analyzed series and control variables. We 
followed a methodology for unit root pre-testing for unknown DGP similar to the one 
outlined in Enders, 2003, pg. 213-214: 
 
1. Start with the least restrictive of the plausible models (which will generally 
include a trend and a drift, and test the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, there is no need to proceed any further. 
Conclude that the series doesn’t contain a unit root. 
2. If null is not rejected, test for the significance of the trend. If the trend is not 
significant we can proceed to the next step. If the trend is significant, conclude 
there is a unit root. 
3. Estimate the model without the trend and test for the presence of a unit root 
using the  (Tau) statistic. If the null is rejected, we can conclude there is no 
unit root, if the null is not rejected, test for the significance of the mean. If the 
drift is not significant proceed to the next step. If the drift is significant, 
conclude there is a unit root. 
4. Estimate the model without the trend or drift and use the  statistic to test for 
the presence of a unit root. If the null is rejected, conclude that the series has 
no unit root; otherwise conclude the series has a unit root. 
 
The results of the ADF tests revealed unit roots in the data series for the Average 
Price for all three Brands in all four markets and also in Commodity Price series. 
(Please see Appendix I for results of the ADF tests). 
 
 
b. Cointegration Testing 
The detection of stochastic trends in each of the average price series prompts the 
testing for long run equilibrium or cointegration between the average price series in 
each market.7 
Linear combinations of nonstationary variables are also nonstationary, but there may 
exist some nonstationary variables whose linear combination may be stationary. Such 
variables are said to be cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
 
Engle and Granger, 1987, recommend a Two-stage method for testing for 
cointegration, but this procedure is ideal for a bivariate cointegration situation as it 
tests for a single cointegrating relationship. A multivariate model is best served by the 
Johansen multivariate procedure (Johansen, 1988, and, Johansen and Juselius 1990) 
as there may be more than one cointegrating relation and this method tests for r 
cointegrating relations.  
 
We first test all four nonstationary variables in each market (three Brand prices and 
the Commodity Price) for cointegration. Comparing the calculated value of the Trace 
statistic against critical values provided by the VARMAX Procedure in SAS® 
indicates that in each market the cointegration system has a rank of 2, indicating the 
presence of two distinct cointegration vectors. Recursively excluding one series each 
from the test indicates that the Commodity Price is not cointegrated with the Average 
Price series. This confirms that only the three Average Price series are cointegrated. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
 
The cointegration between the Average Prices for the three Brands in consideration 
with the fact that the Sales series themselves are stationary gives rise to the logical 
conclusion that the stationarity of Sales is an outcome of the cointegration between 
the Price series, which is in turn an obvious corollary to the competition between the 
Brands. 
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 It is also possible that there might be inter-market effects of price competition, in addition to the within 
market effects, for e.g. the equilibrium competitive pricing condition between two brands in one market 
may be determined also by their respective prices in other markets. But we have limited the scope of this 
paper to ‘intra-market’ pricing behavior. 
If the three Price Series did not cointegrate, their stochastic trends would not cancel 
out hence the Sales which is a linear combination of the Price series and other 
explanatory variables, would also have been nonstationary. 
 
Consider a Brand with Sales, SA and price, PA.  
Then, a simple Sales Response function can then be written as; 
 
SA = APA + BPB + e ..............................................................................(1) 
 
Where PB represents the Price of a competitor, A and B represent the response 
parameters and e represents the disturbance term.  
 
Now given that PA, PB ~ CI (1, 1), we have the following long-run model for the two 
prices: 
 
PA = PB +   ............................................................................. (2) 
 
With  as the long run coefficient and the disturbance term ~ I (0). 
 
(2) can be multiplied with any scalar to derive equivalent cointegrating relationships.  
 
Since in (1) we are fitting an I (0) dependent variable to nonstationary variables that 
are  CI (1, 1), we are in effect estimating values of A and B  that result in a linear 
combination of PA and PB that is I (0) and therefore, we have a stable regression, with 
I (0) residuals. 
 
When we extend this to the three Brands case as we are analyzing in this study, the 
presence of the two distinct cointegration relationships makes it a little more 
complex. The two cointegration equations should be considered distinct from the 
sales response function while the Sales series are themselves a function of only the 
changes or differences of the Price Series as long as equilibrium is maintained.  
 
Disequilibrium in one period may be caused by the shock to one of the Price series in 
the two cointegration equations, which is reflected in both the I (1) Price series and  
I (0) Sales series of the corresponding Brand. This disequilibrium is corrected in the 
next few periods, which is incorporated through the lagged disturbance term from the 
cointegration equations in the Sales Response function itself. Therefore we assume 
that the disequilibrium might cause a temporary change in the relative market position 
of a Brand through a change in sales, but this temporary shift will mean-revert in the 
next few periods. 
 
With this theory we can proceed to develop the long run model for their Prices and 
the functional form of sales response for each of the three Brands. 
 
Let Sa, Sb and Sc be the sales for the three Brands A, B and C, and Pa, Pb and Pc be 
their respective Prices. For simplicity sake we will leave out for now the intercept 
terms and the stationary variables like merchandising, discounting and Television 
advertising. 
 
Therefore the two long run equilibrium models for Prices normalized on Pa are as 
follows: 
 
Pa = 1 Pb + ab   ab ~ (0, 2) ......................................……(3) 
 
Pa =  2 Pc + ac   ac ~ (0, 2) ......................................…….(4) 
 
 
Where 1 and 2 are the long run coefficients and the modified sales response 
function is as follows: 
 
Sa = 1 Pa + 2 Pb + 3 Pc + 1ab, t-1 + 2ac, t-1 + e1    e1 ~ (0, 2).........…(5) 
 
Sb = 4 Pa + 5 Pb + 6 Pc + 1ab, t-1 + 2ac, t-1 + e2   e2 ~ (0, 2).........…(6) 
 
Sc = 7 Pa + 8 Pb + 9 Pc + 1ab, t-1 + 2ac, t-1 + e3    e3 ~ (0, 2).........….(7) 
 
 
Where i can be interpreted as short-term price elasticity (since we are working with 
logs of both sales and prices), with 1, 5 and 9 as the own price short-term 
elasticities, and the remaining i as the short-term cross-elasticities in the respective 
sales response equations.  
 
Since i is the adjustment coefficient for the price disequilibrium which has a 
negative relation with sales for most goods, typically expected sign for i should be 
the opposite of the expected sign for the adjustment coefficient in the error correction 
model for Price, i.e., it should be positive.8 This makes economic sense, since the 
previous period Price disequilibrium will cause sales to move in the opposite 
direction and hence the current period sales will offset the price disequilibrium by 
moving in the same direction as the price disequilibrium. 9 
 
All the regressors in the Sales Response model are I (0), hence standard regression 
inference is valid. Also since current period sales do not enter current period Price 
equation there are no simultaneity issues and OLS should yield unbiased and 
consistent estimates. Since we are not differencing the Sales series, we do not lose the 
low frequency long-run cycles within sales, but the downside is that we might have 
residual autocorrelation as we don’t difference the Sales series, which even though 
stationary will most likely be positively autocorrelated. 
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 On the other hand if the error correction term were based on a positively correlated variable like 
Advertising, the adjustment coefficient would be negative since a positive error in the previous period 
would lead to a negative correction in Sales this period. 
9
 ab, t-1 and ac, t-1 are referred to as ec1and ec2 respectively in the results tables. 
5. Empirical Results 
 
We have tabulated the empirical results for the three Brands in each of the four 
markets in Appendix IV.  
 
Markets I & II exhibit significant first order residual correlation. This confirms our 
expectation that the lack of differencing of the dependent variable might lead to low 
estimates of the DW statistic. For the worst offender, Brand C in Market II, we used 
Proc Autoreg in SAS® to remove residual correlation. 10 
 
The equilibrium correction (ec) term did not stay in all the models. Out of the 10 
Markets in which the ec term stayed in 5 came in with a positive coefficient and 4 
came in insignificant for  = 0.1. Interestingly in 3 markets, the equilibrium 
adjustment term stayed in with a very significant negative coefficient. 
 
In the markets where the differenced price variables stayed, they have expected signs, 
although in 4 out of 12 markets they were not significant for  = 0.1. 
 
The short-term price elasticities (PE) are in almost all Brands and Markets reasonable 
and of correct sign. The stationary variables have been included only where they were 
significant ( = 0.1) and of the right sign. R-squares range from 0.44 to 0.74. 
 
Own elasticities range from (2.3259) to (0.1419), with Brand C coming in with 
generally low elasticities, which makes sense due to its niche market position.  
 
In Market I, Brand A own PE is (0.7781) and there are no short-run Cross-elasticities, 
but the adjustment elasticity for the long-run relation between Brand A and Brand B 
is  significant (0.5348), indicating that there is no short-run pricing impact between 
Brand A and Brand B, but they do have a long-run cross-elasticity.  
 
Another interesting example is the model for Brand B sales in Market I, where it has 
a high and significant own PE (1.0263) and Brand A is complementary to Brand B 
and the long-run equilibrium is between Brand B and C, therefore the short-term 
cross-elasticity for Brand C has the expected sign. 
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 Proc Autoreg in SAS® estimates the following equation for the AR error process: 
t = -1t-1+........ -it-n + t 
Therefore in the output for Proc Autoreg, AR ‘’ term coefficient signs are reversed, for positively 
correlated t, the estimated coefficient will be negative and for negatively correlated t, the estimated 
coefficient will be positive. We have reversed the sign of the AR coefficient to convey a more intuitive 
sense of the underlying correlation structure in the error term. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Although the empirical results from the market models for the three Brands leave a 
little more to be desired in terms of standard regression diagnostics, and significance 
of the adjustment coefficients which is in less than 50% of the analyzed models, the 
preliminary results in this study confirm at least in some cases that there is a very 
distinct correction mechanism between the nonstationary price variables and the 
stationary sales series. 
 
The adjustment coefficients may not have an interpretation as speeds of adjustment, 
but they have an interpretation as elasticities of correction. Since they represent 
disequilibrium between prices for competing Brands, the coefficient itself is the 
elasticity of the equilibrium correction. For instance a coefficient of 0.3 would 
indicate that for every percent price disequilibrium or shock in a given period, the 
between the two Brands, the following period sales would change by 0.3%. In simple 
terms it would mean that given the other Brand’s price constant a 0.3% of sales 
gained would be lost for every 1% equilibrium error caused by the Brand cutting its 
price. 
 
The chart below is a simple illustration of equilibrium correction between the prices 
and sales in two competing Brands X and Y. 
 
Fig.9 Error Correction Illustration 
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In period 3, Brand X cuts its price by $1, causing its sales to increase by 2 units at the 
cost of Brand Y’s sales, which dips by 2 units. In the following period, Brand Y cuts 
its price by $1, restoring its lost sales, and sales return to equilibrium levels, although 
the price series, which are nonstationary with persistent shocks, do not revert to their 
previous levels. 
 In a real market, the structure of competition is much more complex, with possibly 
several Brands vying for market-share. In such a complex scenario, the actions of one 
player reverberate through several other Brands in the category before equilibrium is 
restored. Also a small niche player might be insulated from the shocks in the prices of 
the larger players in the category although it might cointegrate with their prices due to 
common input costs, which is why we did not see the adjustment term staying in all 
models. The negative adjustment coefficients are harder to explain as it does not 
make sense that the previous period’s disequilibrium would lead to further 
disequilibrium, unless the sales were nonstationary too, in which case it should have 
been differenced and an Error Correction Model in the traditional sense would 
become applicable. In the case of stationary sales, negative price adjustment 
coefficients might be indicative of an incorrect rejection of the null of unit root. 
 
The above results provide a potential method to incorporate a hybrid approach of 
levels regression and Error Correction Modeling to better represent the dynamics of 
competitive pricing in mature markets. 
  
    
Appendix I- Unit Root Tests 
 
Market Series Type Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F
Market I Brand A Average Price Zero Mean -0.0477 0.6709 -0.08 0.6549
Market I Brand A Average Price Single Mean -14.5128 0.0407 -2.36 0.1549 2.8 0.357
Market I Brand A Average Price Trend -27.8027 0.0102 -3.39 0.056 6.03 0.0665
Market I Brand A Sales Zero Mean -0.0384 0.673 -0.12 0.6401
Market I Brand A Sales Single Mean -98.1445 0.0012 -6.06 <.0001 18.34 0.001
Market I Brand A Sales Trend -115.961 0.0001 -6.54 <.0001 21.55 0.001
Market I Brand B Average Price Zero Mean 0.1377 0.7138 0.3 0.7718
Market I Brand B Average Price Single Mean -18.486 0.0143 -2.64 0.0871 3.63 0.1467
Market I Brand B Average Price Trend -40.7763 0.0005 -3.69 0.0259 6.83 0.0364
Market I Brand B Sales Zero Mean -0.0572 0.6687 -0.17 0.6226
Market I Brand B Sales Single Mean -156.054 0.0001 -7.09 <.0001 25.12 0.001
Market I Brand B Sales Trend -157.817 0.0001 -7.1 <.0001 25.25 0.001
Market I Brand C Average Price Zero Mean -0.0675 0.6663 -0.18 0.6214
Market I Brand C Average Price Single Mean -29.8981 0.0012 -3.33 0.0153 5.55 0.0227
Market I Brand C Average Price Trend -35.4858 0.0015 -3.41 0.0541 5.96 0.0703
Market I Brand C Sales Zero Mean -0.0318 0.6745 -0.13 0.6393
Market I Brand C Sales Single Mean -83.476 0.0012 -5.67 <.0001 16.05 0.001
Market I Brand C Sales Trend -84.1819 0.0005 -5.65 <.0001 15.98 0.001
Market II Brand A Average Price Zero Mean 0.0684 0.6975 0.29 0.7698
Market II Brand A Average Price Single Mean -16.5449 0.0239 -2.51 0.1141 3.24 0.244
Market II Brand A Average Price Trend -20.4496 0.0549 -2.8 0.199 3.97 0.3847
Market II Brand A Sales Zero Mean -0.0955 0.66 -0.29 0.5802
Market II Brand A Sales Single Mean -106.419 0.0001 -6.09 <.0001 18.53 0.001
Market II Brand A Sales Trend -134.387 0.0001 -6.7 <.0001 22.51 0.001
Market II Brand B Average Price Zero Mean 0.1496 0.7167 0.57 0.8392
Market II Brand B Average Price Single Mean -18.5646 0.014 -2.54 0.1077 3.48 0.1853
Market II Brand B Average Price Trend -22.5696 0.0343 -2.81 0.196 4 0.3777
Market II Brand B Sales Zero Mean -0.0915 0.6609 -0.33 0.566
Market II Brand B Sales Single Mean -58.6576 0.0012 -4.89 0.0001 11.98 0.001
Market II Brand B Sales Trend -62.1938 0.0005 -4.99 0.0004 12.45 0.001
Market II Brand C Average Price Zero Mean 0.0576 0.695 0.17 0.7356
Market II Brand C Average Price Single Mean -23.9901 0.0034 -3.03 0.0348 4.65 0.0495
Market II Brand C Average Price Trend -57.5115 0.0005 -4.18 0.0061 8.74 0.001
Market II Brand C Sales Zero Mean -0.1442 0.649 -0.44 0.5216
Market II Brand C Sales Single Mean -48.0374 0.0012 -4.39 0.0005 9.67 0.001
Market II Brand C Sales Trend -49.8973 0.0005 -4.47 0.0023 10.01 0.001
Market III Brand A Average Price Zero Mean 0.1608 0.7194 0.58 0.8407
Market III Brand A Average Price Single Mean -10.1252 0.1248 -1.66 0.4514 1.6 0.6638
Market III Brand A Average Price Trend -19.0469 0.0744 -2.49 0.334 3.53 0.4721
Market III Brand A Sales Zero Mean -0.0919 0.6608 -0.22 0.6047
Market III Brand A Sales Single Mean -204.292 0.0001 -7.69 <.0001 29.53 0.001
Market III Brand A Sales Trend -205.739 0.0001 -7.71 <.0001 29.9 0.001
Market III Brand B Average Price Zero Mean 0.1705 0.7217 0.8 0.8847
Market III Brand B Average Price Single Mean -7.6001 0.2327 -1.53 0.5172 1.55 0.6748
Market III Brand B Average Price Trend -24.0231 0.0247 -2.85 0.1804 4.25 0.3275
Market III Brand B Sales Zero Mean -0.1341 0.6513 -0.42 0.5293
Market III Brand B Sales Single Mean -129.596 0.0001 -6.78 <.0001 23.01 0.001
Market III Brand B Sales Trend -135.636 0.0001 -6.88 <.0001 23.68 0.001
Market III Brand C Average Price Zero Mean 0.0688 0.6976 0.13 0.7231
Market III Brand C Average Price Single Mean -34.2877 0.0012 -3.27 0.0184 5.4 0.0264
Market III Brand C Average Price Trend -38.7239 0.0007 -3.28 0.0731 5.55 0.0917
Market III Brand C Sales Zero Mean -0.1154 0.6555 -0.33 0.5654
Market III Brand C Sales Single Mean -249.341 0.0001 -8.14 <.0001 33.17 0.001
Market III Brand C Sales Trend -269.615 0.0001 -8.3 <.0001 34.44 0.001
Market IV Brand A Average Price Zero Mean 0.0354 0.6898 0.13 0.7232
Market IV Brand A Average Price Single Mean -20.6792 0.008 -2.66 0.0842 3.56 0.1629
Market IV Brand A Average Price Trend -20.7311 0.0516 -2.49 0.3342 3.51 0.4765
Market IV Brand A Sales Zero Mean -0.0295 0.675 -0.11 0.6461
Market IV Brand A Sales Single Mean -160.867 0.0001 -7.2 <.0001 25.91 0.001
Market IV Brand A Sales Trend -169.446 0.0001 -7.23 <.0001 26.26 0.001
Market IV Brand B Average Price Zero Mean 0.1506 0.7169 0.57 0.8383
Market IV Brand B Average Price Single Mean -18.1747 0.0155 -1.95 0.3102 2.1 0.5349
Market IV Brand B Average Price Trend -30.7527 0.005 -2.72 0.2286 4.47 0.2833
Market IV Brand B Sales Zero Mean -0.0683 0.6662 -0.26 0.591
Market IV Brand B Sales Single Mean -151.949 0.0001 -7.02 <.0001 24.68 0.001
Market IV Brand B Sales Trend -152.289 0.0001 -7.01 <.0001 24.56 0.001
Market IV Brand C Average Price Zero Mean -0.0189 0.6774 -0.07 0.6599
Market IV Brand C Average Price Single Mean -42.7607 0.0012 -3.79 0.0038 7.18 0.001
Market IV Brand C Average Price Trend -42.6 0.0005 -3.76 0.0212 7.13 0.0283
Market IV Brand C Sales Zero Mean -0.051 0.6701 -0.16 0.6271
Market IV Brand C Sales Single Mean -149.239 0.0001 -6.99 <.0001 24.4 0.001
Market IV Brand C Sales Trend -150.65 0.0001 -6.97 <.0001 24.32 0.001
All Markets Commodity Price Zero Mean 0.8925 0.8925 1.88 0.9855
All Markets Commodity Price Single Mean 1.0854 0.9898 0.49 0.9858 1.75 0.6237
All Markets Commodity Price Trend -4.7298 0.8364 -1.09 0.9268 1.45 0.8889
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests
Appendix II- Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests 
 
Average Price Series & Commodity Price 
 
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.2376 94.37 47.21 Constant Linear
1 1 0.1827 52.59 29.38
2 2 0.1296 21.52 15.34
3 3 0.0009 0.13 3.84
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.3646 123.05 47.21 Constant Linear
1 1 0.1861 53.21 29.38
2 2 0.1302 21.5 15.34
3 3 0.0001 0.02 3.84
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.3303 147.71 47.21 Constant Linear
1 1 0.2572 85.97 29.38
2 2 0.2291 40.17 15.34
3 3 0.0006 0.09 3.84
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.3669 137.75 47.21 Constant Linear
1 1 0.2361 67.34 29.38
2 2 0.1544 25.88 15.34
3 3 0.0003 0.05 3.84
Market II
Cointegration Rank Test
Market I
Cointegration Rank Test
Market IV
Cointegration Rank Test
Market III
Cointegration Rank Test
 
 
Results for the Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests Excluding Commodity Price 
 
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.2262 77.04 29.38 Constant Linear
1 1 0.1479 37.55 15.34
2 2 0.0804 12.91 3.84
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.2262 77.1 34.8 Constant Constant
1 1 0.1479 37.6 19.99
2 2 0.0807 12.96 9.13
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.3593 108.46 29.38 Constant Linear
1 1 0.1656 39.9 15.34
2 2 0.075 12.01 3.84
H_0: Rank=r H_1: Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace Critical Value DriftInECM DriftInProcess
0 0 0.3593 108.66 34.8 Constant Constant
1 1 0.1657 40.1 19.99
2 2 0.0762 12.21 9.13
Market III
Cointegration Rank Test
Market IV
Cointegration Rank Test
Market I
Cointegration Rank Test
Market II
Cointegration Rank Test
 
 
 Appendix III- Empirical Results (Unadjusted for Autoregressive Error) 
 
Market I- Brand A 
 
SSE 13.0900024 DFE 148
MSE 0.08845 Root MSE 0.2974
SBC 92.0805861 AIC 70.7766103
Regress R-Square 0.5294 Total R-Square 0.5294
Durbin-Watson 1.4035 Pr < DW <.0001
Pr > DW 1
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 -2.856 4.8561 -0.59 0.5573
Pa 1 -0.7781 0.1383 -5.62 <.0001
ACV_Distribution_Brand A 1 0.1109 0.0487 2.28 0.0242
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 0.011 0.001166 9.45 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 -0.005226 0.001404 -3.72 0.0003
Seasonal Index 1 0.0104 0.002999 3.45 0.0007
ec1 1 0.5348 0.221 2.42 0.0167
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
Market I- Brand B 
 
SSE 13.6998246 DFE 147
MSE 0.0932 Root MSE 0.30528
SBC 104.181823 AIC 79.8344223
Regress R-Square 0.4471 Total R-Square 0.4471
Durbin-Watson 1.5904 Pr < DW 0.0036
Pr > DW 0.9964
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 8.1956 0.3229 25.38 <.0001
Pb 1 -1.0263 0.1586 -6.47 <.0001
Pa 1 -0.3146 0.1428 -2.2 0.0292
Pc 1 0.6114 0.277 2.21 0.0289
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.007648 0.001446 5.29 <.0001
RFG_DC2 1 0.0414 0.013 3.19 0.0017
Seasonal Index 1 0.009056 0.00323 2.8 0.0057
ec2 1 0.5417 0.1829 2.96 0.0036
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
Market I- Brand C 
 
SSE 4.28611202 DFE 148
MSE 0.02896 Root MSE 0.17018
SBC -80.972067 AIC -102.27604
Regress R-Square 0.5625 Total R-Square 0.5625
Durbin-Watson 1.3396 Pr < DW <.0001
Pr > DW 1
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 5.6196 0.4562 12.32 <.0001
Pc 1 -0.8906 0.1557 -5.72 <.0001
ACV_Distribution_Brand C 1 0.0205 0.004939 4.14 <.0001
Price_Discount_Brand C 1 0.006985 0.001176 5.94 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 -0.002839 0.000654 -4.34 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 -0.002076 0.000807 -2.57 0.011
ec1 1 -0.3147 0.1178 -2.67 0.0084
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
Market II- Brand A 
 
SSE 12.1974302 DFE 145
MSE 0.08412 Root MSE 0.29003
SBC 96.2642235 AIC 65.8299723
Regress R-Square 0.5075 Total R-Square 0.5075
Durbin-Watson 1.4736 Pr < DW 0.0001
Pr > DW 0.9999
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.4762 3.3899 0.14 0.8885
Pa 1 -0.6013 0.2403 -2.5 0.0134
ACV_Distribution_Brand A 1 0.0791 0.0342 2.31 0.0221
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 0.008106 0.001225 6.62 <.0001
Price Discount_Brand A 1 0.0107 0.002591 4.13 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 -0.002302 0.001106 -2.08 0.0391
Price Discount_Brand B 1 -0.005617 0.00244 -2.3 0.0227
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 -0.004169 0.001534 -2.72 0.0074
Seasonal Index 1 0.009597 0.00312 3.08 0.0025
ec2 1 -0.3262 0.2383 -1.37 0.1732
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
Market II- Brand B 
 
SSE 8.22565854 DFE 147
MSE 0.05596 Root MSE 0.23655
SBC 21.1188229 AIC -0.1398453
Regress R-Square 0.6645 Total R-Square 0.6645
Durbin-Watson 1.3287 Pr < DW <.0001
Pr > DW 1
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 8.6851 0.1859 46.71 <.0001
Pb 1 -0.9668 0.2386 -4.05 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.006336 0.000879 7.21 <.0001
Price Discount_Brand B 1 0.0171 0.002158 7.94 <.0001
Seasonal Index 1 0.007309 0.002002 3.65 0.0004
Lagged  Commodity Price 1 -0.0168 0.007402 -2.28 0.0243
ec1 1 -0.8184 0.2951 -2.77 0.0063
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
Market II- Brand C 
 
SSE 7.45445901 DFE 147
MSE 0.05071 Root MSE 0.22519
SBC 9.85337166 AIC -14.494029
Regress R-Square 0.5439 Total R-Square 0.5439
Durbin-Watson 1.0715 Pr < DW <.0001
Pr > DW 1
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 5.6312 0.2646 21.28 <.0001
Pc 1 -0.1523 0.2219 -0.69 0.4934
ACV_Distribution_Brand C 1 0.0204 0.002497 8.17 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.003542 0.001225 2.89 0.0044
Price_Discount_Brand C 1 0.005545 0.00153 3.62 0.0004
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 -0.004387 0.000929 -4.72 <.0001
Seasonal Index 1 0.003079 0.001833 1.68 0.0951
ec2 1 -0.1454 0.1838 -0.79 0.4303
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Market II- Brand C Adjusted for Autoregressive Error 
 
SSE 5.63004207 DFE 146
MSE 0.03856 Root MSE 0.19637
SBC -28.278734 AIC -55.66956
Regress R-Square 0.3899 Total R-Square 0.6555
Durbin-Watson 1.9599 Pr < DW 0.3768
Pr > DW 0.6232 0
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 5.7453 0.3342 17.19 <.0001
Pc 1 -0.0695 0.187 -0.37 0.7106
ACV_Distribution_Brand C 1 0.0183 0.003015 6.06 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.003388 0.001588 2.13 0.0345
Price_Discount_Brand C 1 0.003657 0.00144 2.54 0.0121
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 -0.003044 0.000889 -3.42 0.0008
Seasonal Index 1 0.002729 0.002545 1.07 0.2854
ec2 1 -0.1134 0.2124 -0.53 0.5942
AR1 1 0.5317 0.0736 -7.23 <.0001
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
 
 
Market III- Brand A 
 
SSE 21.9211828 DFE 149
MSE 0.14712 Root MSE 0.38356
SBC 166.955883 AIC 148.695333
Regress R-Square 0.5602 Total R-Square 0.5602
Durbin-Watson 1.7917 Pr < DW 0.0729
Pr > DW 0.9271
Intercept 1 8.5964 0.1977 43.47 <.0001
Pa 1 -2.3259 0.2742 -8.48 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 0.0129 0.001823 7.07 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 -0.004147 0.001924 -2.16 0.0327
Seasonal Index 1 0.008025 0.002113 3.8 0.0002
ec1 1 0.4308 0.4263 1.01 0.3139
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
Market III- Brand B 
 
SSE 11.6606243 DFE 149
MSE 0.07826 Root MSE 0.27975
SBC 69.1143497 AIC 50.853799
Regress R-Square 0.5527 Total R-Square 0.5527
Durbin-Watson 1.6578 Pr < DW 0.0136
Pr > DW 0.9864
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 8.6315 0.1541 56.01 <.0001
Pb 1 -1.2963 0.2232 -5.81 <.0001
Pc 1 0.159 0.1411 1.13 0.2616
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.0141 0.001408 9.99 <.0001
Seasonal Index 1 0.003196 0.001481 2.16 0.0325
ec2 1 0.239 0.1784 1.34 0.1824
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
 
 
Market III- Brand C 
 
SSE 5.01991347 DFE 146
MSE 0.03438 Root MSE 0.18543
SBC -46.390154 AIC -73.78098
Regress R-Square 0.7409 Total R-Square 0.7409
Durbin-Watson 1.5349 Pr < DW 0.001
Pr > DW 0.999
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 5.9531 0.4334 13.73 <.0001
Pc 1 -1.1276 0.1251 -9.01 <.0001
ACV_Distribution_Brand C 1 0.0212 0.007753 2.74 0.0069
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.005713 0.002263 2.52 0.0127
Price_Discount_Brand C 1 0.007139 0.001166 6.12 <.0001
Price Discount_Brand B 1 -0.002612 0.001452 -1.8 0.0742
Difference of Commodity Price 1 -0.0129 0.005804 -2.22 0.0278
ec1 1 -0.4074 0.209 -1.95 0.0532
ec2 1 -0.6357 0.1344 -4.73 <.0001
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
Market IV- Brand A 
 
SSE 10.03242 DFE 148
MSE 0.06779 Root MSE 0.26036
SBC 50.8464153 AIC 29.5424394
Regress R-Square 0.5249 Total R-Square 0.5249
Durbin-Watson 1.8389 Pr < DW 0.1208
Pr > DW 0.8792
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 8.466 0.1936 43.72 <.0001
Pa 1 -0.345 0.2162 -1.6 0.1127
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 0.009935 0.001285 7.73 <.0001
Price Discount_Brand A 1 0.003317 0.001835 1.81 0.0728
RMH_GRP 1 0.000579 0.000324 1.79 0.0755
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 -0.003102 0.001273 -2.44 0.016
Seasonal Index 1 0.009027 0.002112 4.27 <.0001
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 
 
 
Market IV- Brand B 
 
SSE 7.15429635 DFE 147
MSE 0.04867 Root MSE 0.22061
SBC 3.48297798 AIC -20.864423
Regress R-Square 0.5612 Total R-Square 0.5612
Durbin-Watson 1.8564 Pr < DW 0.1392
Pr > DW 0.8608
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 8.3652 0.1645 50.86 <.0001
Pb 1 -0.8216 0.157 -5.23 <.0001
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.008836 0.001111 7.95 <.0001
RFG_DC1 1 0.0287 0.009281 3.1 0.0023
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand A 1 -0.003009 0.001002 -3 0.0031
Seasonal Index 1 0.00845 0.001825 4.63 <.0001
Commodity Price 1 -0.0202 0.007041 -2.87 0.0048
ec2 1 0.4696 0.1855 2.53 0.0124
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
 
 Market IV- Brand B 
 
SSE 6.09292363 DFE 150
MSE 0.04062 Root MSE 0.20154
SBC -36.537977 AIC -51.755102
Regress R-Square 0.4683 Total R-Square 0.4683
Durbin-Watson 1.2747 Pr < DW <.0001
Pr > DW 1
Variable DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 6.2005 0.1811 34.24 <.0001
Pc 1 -0.1419 0.1517 -0.94 0.351
Pa 1 0.0528 0.1362 0.39 0.699
ACV_Distribution_Brand C 1 0.0114 0.003161 3.6 0.0004
ACV on Any Promotion_Brand B 1 0.0188 0.002141 8.76 <.0001
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
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